This paper presents a theory of location choice that draws on insights from the incomplete contracts and investment flexibility (real option) literatures. We provide conditions under which human capital is more efficiently created and better utilized within industrial clusters that contain similar firms.
Introduction
One of the fundamental issues in economics relates to the location of production.
Where Þrms and industries locate is a primary determinant of the economic growth of both regional and national economies. These choices affect the design of our cities as well as the pattern of trade between nations. This paper examines the location choice of Þrms within knowledge-based industries (e.g., software and pharmaceutical development). SpeciÞcally, we consider the incentives of these Þrms to locate either together, within geographical clusters, or in a number of geographically separate regions. The issue of industrial clustering dates back at least to Marshall (1890) and has received substantial attention in the recent literature.
1 By focusing on transportation costs and exogenous natural advantages, the early literature explains why Þrms in some industries tend to locate in a number of geographically separate regions. 2 This literature, however, is much less applicable to knowledge-based Þrms whose products are almost costless to transport and which employ very little in the way of resources other than human capital. 3 More applicable are the arguments that focus on the advantages of clustering that arise because of the beneÞts of a more active market for skilled labor and the potential for knowledge spillovers.
The discussion in most of the recent literature, which points to Silicon Valley 1 There is an extensive urban economics literature that addresses location issues for generic industries. For excellent reviews see Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999) , Fujita and Thisse (2002) and Duranton and Puga (2003) .
2 Ellison and Glaeser (1999) Þnd that proxies related to natural advantages can explain roughly 20% of their empirical measures of agglomeration.
3 Abstracting from transportation costs seems particularly suitable to explain location in knowledge-based industries. Moreover, Glaeser and Kohlhase (2003) have reported that transportation costs for manufacturing goods have fallen by over 90% in the last century, and argue that, to a large extent, the world is better characterized as a place where "it is essentially free to move goods, but expensive to move people." This suggests that the issues that we discuss here may be more broadly applicable.
as the quintessential example, is that strong economic forces lead knowledge-based industries to cluster.
4 However, this literature generally ignores those cases of successful knowledge-based Þrms that locate away from industrial clusters. The most notable case is Microsoft, which became the industry leader after locating in Seattle, which at the time was not a center for software development. Another notable case is Nations-Bank, a North Carolina Bank which became one of the largest banks in the U.S. after taking over Bank of America.
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The model developed in this paper is consistent with the Silicon Valley phenomena as well as with the observation that some knowledge-based Þrms choose to locate on their own. The model is based on the idea that a key distinction between locating within a cluster rather than in isolation has to do with the competitiveness of the market for skilled labor. SpeciÞcally, since we assume that it is costly for workers to change locations, an isolated Þrm can become a monopsonist in the market for the specialized labor while, within a cluster, workers with industry speciÞc skills can sell their labor in a competitive labor market. As Manes and Andrews (1994, p. 120) describe it, the structure of labor markets played a central role in Microsoft's location decision:
"Paul Allen increasingly argued for a move back to familiar Seattle turf. Hiring might be simpler in Silicon Valley, but keeping employees would clearly be harder, a major consideration in a business where the primary assets walk out the door every night (...) The tremendous demand for their services had made Bay Area engineers notoriously Þckle; at the Þrst sign of dissatisfaction, they would Þnd a position across the street or check out a 'job fair' brimming with offers."
4 In addition to the above cited papers in the economics literature, there is also a discussion of these issues in the management literature. In particular, see Porter (1990) . See also Saxenian (1994) for a forceful discussion of these issues in the case of Silicon Valley.
5 Ellison and Glaeser (1997) document that while a slight degree of concentration is widespread, the more extreme concentration of industries such as automobile and computer exists only in a smaller subset of industries.
As the preceding quote illustrates, a competitive labor market can be a twoedged sword. It can help Þrms hire labor when they are expanding, but it can also make it difficult to retain labor. Moreover, as we illustrate in our model, labor is more efficiently utilized within clusters since they can be redeployed to the most productive Þrms. SpeciÞcally, within clusters, Þrms that realize favorable Þrm-speciÞc productivity shocks beneÞt from hiring workers that leave Þrms that suffer unfavorable Þrm-speciÞc shocks. 6 This aspect of our model extends the analysis in Krugman (1991) that considers the advantage of labor market pooling.
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The case for clustering becomes less straightforward when we consider how workers acquire their specialized skills. Following Rotemberg and Saloner (2000) , we show that there is an added advantage associated with clustering if developing human capital requires that the worker expends effort. However, if the development of these skills requires an investment (e.g., training) by the Þrm, then there is an offsetting cost associated with clustering. 8 In other words, within a cluster, employees appropriate the value of the skills (and technology) acquired on the job because they can sell their skills at a competitive price to their employer's competitors. Hence, they have an incentive to put in the effort required to acquire such skills. However, anticipating this, Þrms within a cluster have less incentive to invest in their employees' human capital, and thus provide less training than their more isolated counterparts.
Our model captures the interaction between these forces in a parsimonious way 6 There is a second line of research that examines the advantages of thick labor markets that arise from better matching workers with Þrms. Papers that address the role of the market in improving the quality of matching include Strange (1990, 1991) and Combes and Duranton (2001) . Mortesen and Pissarides (1999) and Pissarides (2000) review the search literature which addresses the role of market in improving the chances of matching.
7 Dumais, Ellison and Glaeser (1997) examine this issue empirically. SpeciÞcally, they provide evidence that plants locate near other industries when they share the same type of labor, and conclude that "labor market pooling is a dominant force in explaining the agglomeration of industry." 8 Matouschek and Robert-Nicoud (2003) provide a related analysis of the effect of human capital investments on Þrms' location decisions. See also Grossman and Hart (1986) for a similar trade-off in their analysis of vertical integration.
that explicitly illustrates that the creation and allocation of human capital are two sides of the same coin: the way that human capital is allocated determines how it is created. Moreover, the model identiÞes several characteristics that predict which knowledge-based industries are likely to exhibit clustering. For example, when the potential for industry-wide growth is not excessive and when Þrm-level uncertainty is high, then industries are likely to exhibit clustering. There is also likely to be more clustering in industries where the workers must exert effort to acquire their skills but less clustering in growing industries where Þrms must provide signiÞcant training for their workers.
The model also provides implications about how differences between Þrms within an industry affect their location choices. SpeciÞcally, Þrms with better growth prospects are likely to be better positioned to beneÞt from their workers' contribution to their own training and from hiring workers that are trained by their competitors. This result provides an alternative interpretation to the empirical Þndings by Henderson (1986) and Ciccone and Hall (1996) that productivity increases with the density of the economic activity and by Holmes and Stevens (2002) that plant sizes are higher within industry clusters.
9 The conventional interpretation of these Þndings is that because of various externalities, productivity is higher in clusters. In contrast, our results raise the possibility that clusters tend to attract the most efficient Þrms, rather than make existing Þrms more efficient.
We consider three extensions of the main analysis. In the Þrst extension, we introduce uncertainty about aggregate productivity (i.e., systematic shocks) and analyze the relative advantages of clusters versus isolation. We Þnd that a greater degree of aggregate uncertainty reduces Þrms' incentives to cluster. This is because higher 9 There are a number of empirical studies that examine issues that relate to productivity and agglomeration. For an excellent review, see Rosenthal and Strange (2003) .
aggregate uncertainty in clusters limits Þrms' abilities to reallocate human capital among themselves and also because, as we show, Þrms in clusters are not as well positioned to incorporate information about changes in productivity.
The second extension, which allows Þrms to design their production processes in ways that make them more or less compatible with other Þrms, explores the possibility that technological choices differ in clusters versus isolation. SpeciÞcally, we consider the incentives of Þrms to deviate from industry norms in clusters. The analysis identiÞes two opposing effects. By deviating from industry norms, Þrms increase Þrm speciÞc risk, which in turn increases the redeployment beneÞts of clustering. However, if the labor employed by Þrms with very different technologies are less compatible, a countervailing effect emerges. The relative importance of these effects determines whether clusters prevail in industries in which experimentation and the introduction of new technologies is central.
In the third and Þnal extension we consider how behavioral biases affect Þrms' location decisions. SpeciÞcally, we show that overconÞdent entrepreneurs are more likely to be attracted to clusters because they overvalue the beneÞts associated with the ability to hire workers that are trained by their competitors. Within our setting, overconÞdence can have social beneÞts as well as costs. In isolation, overconÞdence is costly because it leads to too much training. However, within a cluster, since rational entrepreneurs train too few workers, it is possible that social efficiency and Þrms' proÞts can be improved when entrepreneurs are overconÞdent.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and section 3 analyzes it. Section 4 considers the issue of location for heterogenous Þrms and section 5 presents the analysis of location when workers can also invest.
Section 6 considers location when Þrms also can choose their technologies and section 7 analyzes how overconÞdence may affect Þrms' location choices. Section 8 presents some conclusions of the analysis. Proofs and other technical derivations are relegated to the appendix.
The model
We consider a risk neutral economy populated by a continuum of ex-ante identical entrepreneurs (i.e., Þrms), and an unlimited supply of unskilled workers with reservation wage w R . Firms have access to perfect capital markets and are endowed with an investment project described below.
As described in Figure 1 , there are three relevant dates in the economy, t = 0, 1, and 2. At t = 0, Þrms permanently locate. Firms choose whether to locate in a regional economy that includes other Þrms that employ and train similar workers (i.e., within a cluster), or alternatively, to locate away from the cluster (i.e., in isolation).
At t = 1, the production process starts with an initial stage during which Þrm i hires a certain number of unskilled workers H 1i and then trains h 1i of those hired.
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The actual training is ex post observable but is not veriÞable and hence, the workers cannot sign a contract with the Þrm guaranteeing that they will be trained.
At t = 2, the growth stage, the Þrm receives a productivity shock. After observing the shock, Þrms can contract or expand their operations by either laying off some of its existing workers or, within clusters, by hiring new workers who have obtained training with one of the Þrm's competitors. The main difference between locating within a cluster rather than in isolation is the access that Þrms have to trained workers in the growth stage. While in a cluster skilled workers are hired in a competitive market, in isolation, Þrms have exclusive access to the workers they train at t = 1, and behave as monopsonists in the labor market. For simplicity, we assume that Þrms cannot train new workers at t = 2. Firms have the following production functions at t = 1 and t = 2:
2 and
Q 1 (h 1i ) and Q 2 (h 2i ) correspond to the production functions during the initial stage and the growth stage respectively. In each stage, each Þrm determines the scale of its operations: h 1i during the initial stage, (i.e., the amount of workers trained at t = 1) and h 2i during the growth stage (i.e., the amount of trained workers employed at t = 2). We refer to α > 0 as Þrm productivity in the initial stage and to τ > 0 as the importance of the Þrm's training costs. In addition, we refer to a i as the Þrm productivity in the growth stage and to β > 0 as the intensity of the Þrm's adjustment costs, which make the Þrm production at t = 2 depend on the initial scale h 1i .
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Parameters α, τ and β are deterministic, identical for all Þrms, and known at t = 0 before production starts. In contrast, a i is the realization of a random variableã i , a
Þrm-idiosyncratic productivity shock that occurs at t = 2 prior to production. The
We assume that a L > 0 and (a H − a L ) ( τ β + 1) < α, which simpliÞes the analysis by avoiding non-negativity constraints, and we denote E(ã i ) ≡ā and
Shocks are independent across Þrms, speciÞcally, we assume that if a continuum of Þrms populates a cluster then the empirical distribution of realized shocks, F (a i ), is identical to the ex-ante c.d.f., F (ã i ), i.e., no aggregate uncertainty exists.
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Notice that we are implicity assuming that the marginal productivity of untrained unskilled workers is the same inside and outside the Þrm. That is, unless worker training is provided, the Þrm has no special advantage in employing unskilled workers.
This assumption implies that Þrms beneÞt from employing unskilled workers only when they can compensate them at a salary below their reservation wage.
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We Þnish the presentation of the model by specifying three important assumptions of our model. First, we assume short term labor contracts that cannot be contingent on training. Hence, our analysis of the contracting issues draws on the literature on incomplete contracts, i.e., Grossman and Hart (1986) , and on the effects of the inalienability of human capital, i.e., Hart and Moore (1994) . 14 Second, we assume that trained workers must stay in their respective locations (i.e., regions) after they are trained. This assumption captures the idea that individuals initially locate in the region offering the best employment opportunities, but after establishing roots in the community Þnd it costly to relocate. Finally, since we are primarily interested in the interaction between location and the development and utilization of human capital, we abstract from the effects that location may have on product market competition.
SpeciÞcally, we assume a constant price for a Þrm's output (that we normalize to one)
12 In section 6, we relax this assumption and examine location choices in the presence of aggregate uncertainty on productivity shocks.
13 To save on notation, we have omitted the effect that untrained workers can have on a Þrm's production. Because, as stated in the main text, we assume that the productivity of unskilled workers outside (i.e., w R ) and inside the Þrm is the same, our results are unchanged if we specify
where u is the amount of untrained workers employed and θ is their marginal productivity inside the Þrm (which is equal to w R ). 14 In section 5, we revisit this issue and analyze the location problem when both the Þrm and workers can make non-contractible relation speciÞc investments. There, we discuss why long-term contracts themselves can create misincentives in Þrm-worker relationships.
and that Þrms' products can be transported costlessly within a competitive market.
Analysis of the model
We Þrst consider the production and training decisions in isolation and then within an industrial cluster. In each case, we proceed backwards; we start with the scale decision at the growth stage, h 2i , and then consider the scale decision at the initial stage, h 1i .
Isolation
In isolation, the analysis of the growth stage is straightforward. At t = 2, the Þrm acts as a monopsonist in the market for skilled workers, and thus pays them the reservation wage for their services, w R which we normalize to zero. 15 Since the supply of skilled workers is limited by the amount of workers that the Þrm itself trains at t = 1 (i.e., h 2i ≤ h 1i ), afterã i is realized, the Þrm solves:
Solving (1) the demand for skilled labor is h * 2i = h 1i (i.e., the Þrm retains all the workers it trains at t = 1).
At t = 1, the Þrm decides how many workers to hire and to train. On-the-job training is valuable to workers but is costly to Þrms and, more importantly, is noncontractible among parties. This means that Þrms will provide training according to their internal trade-offs without fully incorporating the positive effect of training on workers, a fact that, as we show, will play a crucial role in clusters. Formally, let H 1i be the number of workers hired, and then, among those hired, let h 1i be the number 15 This is without loss of generality as long as a L ≥ w R = 0, that is the productivity of a skilled worker inside the Þrm is always higher than outside the Þrm.
of them assigned to positions that provide on-the-job training.
16 Hence, Þrm i solves
subject to:
Since unskilled workers are equally productive inside and outside the Þrm, H * 1i
remains indeterminate in equilibrium (other than H * i1 ≥ h * 1i ). Therefore, we solve to obtain h * 1i and then simply set
From (4), we derive the Þrst order condition (f.o.c.) to obtain:
which, as showed before, also equals h * 2i . Substituting in (2) yields the Þrm's value in isolation at t = 0, V I i :
3.2 Clustering
The growth decision
At t = 2, the growth decision by Þrm i is the solution to the following problem:
16 The explicit distinction between hired, H 1i , and trained workers, h 1i , is consistent with but not essential for the analysis of the Þrm's decision in isolation. However, we choose to keep the distinction in the isolation analysis to maintain parallelism with the cluster analysis below, where such a distinction plays a crucial role. Also notice that although workers hired at t = 1 must receive the reservation wage the expressions are simpliÞed due to the normalization w R = 0.
where w is the wage paid to the skilled workers at t = 2. From the f.o.c., we obtain Þrm i 0 s demand for skilled workers, h * 2i :
According to (8), Þrm i hires (Þres) additional workers if its realized productivity, a i , is greater (smaller) than the wage at t = 2, w. The importance of the adjustment costs (measured by β) determines the sensitivity of the Þrm's demand for skilled workers to a i .
To determine the wage that clears the market in the cluster at t = 2, i.e., w, we need to consider (i) the aggregate demand for skilled workers, D
and (ii) the aggregate supply of skilled workers:
Market clearing, i.e., D H 2 = S H 2 , yields the equilibrium wage which is equal to the average productivity of the Þrms in the cluster, i.e., w =ā.
The initial scale decision
At t = 1, because on-the-job training is non-contractible among parties, Þrms will provide such training according to their internal trade-offs without fully incorporating the positive effect of training on workers. Consequently, workers will be wary of taking lower wages against promises of future skills that will not necessarily be provided.
We model this time-inconsistency by considering that, Þrst, a Þrm hires a certain number of workers H 1i at t = 1 and then, among those hired, the Þrm allocates 17 Notice that, by virtue of the independence of technology shocks,
h 1i of them to positions that provide on-the-job training. This optimal training decision is anticipated (i.e., rationally expected) by workers who condition their initial salary demands at t = 0, w 0i , on the total number of workers hired by the Þrm.
SpeciÞcally, workers consider the probability of being trained as the ratio of the anticipated number of workers trained, h e 1i , to the number hired, H 1i , and reduce their salary accordingly. Formally, Þrm i maximizes expected proÞts by solving:
Constraint (12) captures the fact that the Þrm may choose not to train some of the hired workers while constraint (12) considers the salary reduction from the reservation wage, which is normalized to zero, that workers will accept when hired by the Þrm as compensation for their expected human capital acquisition (i.e., a participation constraint for workers). Notice that with the initial salary reduction, −w 0i , workers "pay" at t = 1 for their (anticipated) training. SpeciÞcally, a worker is trained with
, and, if trained, her salary increases at t = 2 by w. 18 Substituting constraint (12) into (11) reveals that H * 1i is indeterminate in equilibrium (other than
). This is due to our assumption that unskilled workers are equally productive inside and outside the Þrm. Consequently, without loss of generality, we assume that the Þrm hires only the workers that it can credibly claim to train, which implies that H * 1i = h * 1i . Given this, the following problem can be solved to obtain Þrm i's optimal scale h * 1i :
Substituting w =ā and h *
, and considering that the anticipated level of training h e 1i is not a choice variable for the Þrm, 19 problem (13) can be reduced to:
which, when solved, implies
Expression (15) shows that, in clusters, a Þrm's initial scale decision is "myopic,"
i.e., it is not affected by its expected productivityā. While, all else equal, a higher expected productivity increases the Þrms' incentive to invest in human capital, it also increases the wage at t = 2, and hence, reduces the Þrms' incentive to create human capital. In an economy of identical Þrms, these two effects offset each other leading to the Þrms' myopia on their initial scale decisions.
Finally, in (11), we can compute the Þrm value at t = 0 in the cluster, V C i :
which can be decomposed into three terms: (i) the value created from production in the Þrst period (i.e., Q(h *
), (ii) the value of the human capital created by the Þrm (as measured by the wages obtained by the workers trained by the Þrm, i.e., ) and (iii) the value of the option to adapt the scale of production in the cluster after the shock is realized (i.e., E[(
).
19 To be sure, even though in a (rational expectations) equilibrium the actual level of training equals the workers' conjecture, h e 1i = h * 1i , the conjectured level of training cannot be affected by the Þrm.
The choice of location
When deciding their locations, Þrms face a trade-off between the advantages of isolation on the creation of human capital and the advantages of clusters on the utilization of human capital. This trade-off, which is apparent by comparing (6) and (16), is described in the following proposition:
The difference in Þrm value in the cluster versus in isolation is
Proposition 1 summarizes the main implications of the analysis so far. In industries where trained workers are more productive, i.e., largerā, the relative value of isolation increases. In contrast, when there is more uncertainty about which Þrms will be most productive, i.e., when σ 2 is larger, the relative value of clustering is higher. In addition, the relative value of clusters vis-à-vis isolation is also related to the importance of the Þrm's adjustment costs and the cost of creating human capital.
SpeciÞcally, large adjustment costs (i.e., high β) reduce the value of ßexibility in the cluster, and hence, of clustering, while large costs of creating human capital (i.e., high τ ), make the acquisition of human capital from clusters relatively more attractive, and hence, promotes clusters.
More intuition about the location trade-off can be gained by examining how a social planner would allocate resources in this economy. The social planner must consider two issues: the optimal creation of human capital at t = 1, and its optimal utilization at t = 2. The competitive market in the cluster allocates skilled workers (once trained) optimally. Hence, the social planner would simply replicate the worker allocation that occurs in the cluster:
. Therefore, the planner's problem is reduced to Þnding the optimal Þrm scale at t = 1 in the presence of a competitive labor market, but without the time inconsistency problem in the creation of human capital by Þrms (e.g., by assuming that Þrms internalize the future salary gains that workers obtain from Þrm training). Formally, the problem would be identical to the clustering program but where the term h e 1i w is replaced by h 1i w:
From the f.o.c., we get h
, and substituting in (18) the "Þrst best" Þrm value is obtained:
Notice that in the social planner's solution, Þrms would utilize human capital as they do in the cluster, but would create human capital as they do in isolation. Formally, this is reßected in an additional positive component (with respect to the value in isolation) due to the optimal reallocation of human capital, i.e., V
, and a positive additional component (with respect to the value in clusters) due to the optimal investment in human capital, i.e., V
.
An alternative speciÞcation
We conclude this section by brießy discussing an alternative speciÞcation that produces a trade-off that is similar to the one obtained here. SpeciÞcally, rather than assuming that training is not contractible, we could have assumed that the workers lack the resources to pay-up front for their training, i.e., there is a minimum wage on the Þrst date that exceeds the equilibrium wage that includes the discount workers are willing to take to receive their training. Of course, both assumptions require, additionally, the inalienability of workers' human capital once acquired (i.e., that Þrms become residual claimants of their workers' human capital).
Intuitively, with either friction, Þrms within clusters do not fully internalize the improvements in their workers' human capital, and thus underinvest in their worker's training. In the case that we consider, the fact that training is not contractible creates a time inconsistency problem (namely, once workers agree to reduce their initial salaries, Þrms feel tempted not to honor their training commitment). Similarly, when there is a minimum wage at t = 0, Þrms in clusters may not be able to beneÞt from training their workers, and may thus undertrain their workers when they cannot make binding commitments. In contrast, an isolated Þrm can capture the beneÞt of training their workers in the Þrst period because they can underpay them relative to their productivity in the last period. As was the case in the previous model, this implies that Þrms are more likely to isolate when the gains associated with human capital creation are the highest.
We chose to present the model with the non-contractibility assumption in order to simplify the analysis and to facilitate welfare comparisons. However, we feel the limited liability (i.e., minimum wage) alternative can be a compelling assumption in some circumstances and constitutes, in any case, an additional foundation for our analysis that reinforces our results.
The location choice of heterogeneous Þrms
Up to this point, we have considered an economy of (ex-ante) identical Þrms. In this section, we introduce Þrm heterogeneity to the analysis. We proceed as follows: First, we present a partial equilibrium analysis, where we take as given the presence of a cluster with salary w and examine the location choice of Þrm i, which is assumed to be too small to affect w. Once we characterize the individual Þrm's incentives to cluster, we consider the general equilibrium analysis where all Þrms simultaneously choose where to locate, and examine the endogenous formation of clusters.
The location decision of an individual Þrm
Consider Þrm i with productivityã i which is distributed with c.d.f. F i (ã i ) and density
Firm's i value in isolation immediately follows from (6) in the previous section, i.e.,
. However, to derive its value in the cluster, we must modify the analysis to take into account that, in general,ā i 6 = w. Following similar steps as before (see the appendix for details), we Þnd the human capital created at t = 1,
and the value of a clustered Þrm,
Notice that if a Þrm's expected productivity is equal to the cluster wage, i.e.,ā i = w, 
To examine Þrm i's incentives to join a cluster with wage w, we subtract (6) from (21) and rearrange terms to obtain
As was the case with homogenous Þrms, the decision is determined by the trade-off between the beneÞts of the cluster (i.e., redeployment of human capital,
) and its costs (i.e., underinvestment in human capital,
). Further intuition, however, can be gained by expressing (22) as
from which we can see that the beneÞts of redeploying human capital stem from: (i) ex-ante differences between expected productivity and the cluster average productivity, i.e.,
, and (ii) ex-post differences among Þrms' realized productivities, i.e.,
. In other words, the beneÞts of joining a cluster come from date t = 2 differences in productivity that may or may not be anticipated.
Notice that the Þrst effect (i.e.,
) induces clustering even in the absence of uncertainty (i.e., σ 2 = 0), because Þrms with expected productivity that is greater (smaller) than the wage expect to hire (Þre) workers at t = 2 (i.e.,
). Because of the decreasing returns to scale in the creation of human capital, there is an efficiency gain associated with having the Þrms with a low need for human capital at t = 2 train more workers than they need and indirectly transfer those workers to higher productivity Þrms, which create less human capital than they want to employ. Although a Þrm does not directly compensate its competitors for the trained workers that join their Þrms, indirect compensation accrues to the net providers of human capital who, when located in clusters, can offer a lower wage rate at t = 1.
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An examination of (23) allows us to consider the factors that inßuence a Þrm's decision to join the cluster:
Proposition 2 Clusters are more attractive for Þrms with: (i) higher variance productivity, σ 2 , (ii) lower adjustment costs, β, (iii) higher costs of creating human capital, τ , and (iv) expected productivity that differs more from the cluster wage, i.e.,
Proposition 2 shows that clusters are relatively more valuable when either an-20 Consulting Þrms generally need substantially more associates (i.e., the more junior consultants) than partners, and as a result, a number of associates eventually go to work for their clients. This observation can be viewed from the perspective of our model if we view the consulting Þrms as expecting date t = 2 productivity that induce them to shed employees. As such, our model provides a rationale for why consulting Þrms and their clients may beneÞt from locating near each other. ticipated (i.e., |a i − w|) or unanticipated (i.e., σ 2 ) differences in productivity give a reason to redeploy human capital and also when such a redeployment is not expensive (i.e., low β). 21 Furthermore, if Þrms are not efficient at producing human capital (i.e., low τ ) the underinvestment problem in clusters is ameliorated (the difference between the production of human capital in clusters and in isolation is w τ
Finally, we can check that an increase in the wage reduces the incentives to cluster (i.e.,
While, in general, a higher wage exacerbates the underinvestment problem and reduces the incentive to cluster, Þrms whose productivities are sufficiently below the wage (ā i < (1 − β τ )w) can beneÞt from higher cluster wages. For these Þrms (which are on average "big sellers" of human capital in the cluster), the higher wage produces an increase in the expected revenue from the human capital sold that more than offsets the additional revenue lost due to an exacerbated underinvestment problem. 
Endogenous clusters with heterogeneous Þrms
In the previous section, we examined the incentives of Þrms to join an existing cluster with an exogenous wage, w. This section examines the endogenous formation of clusters, i.e., the simultaneous decision of Þrms that can isolate themselves or can locate within an endogenously formed cluster.
For simplicity, we assume that there is a continuum of Þrms with random expected productivitiesã i = a i +ε i whereε i are zero-mean i.i.d. random variables, and g(ā i ) 21 Notice that for Þrms with expected productivity above the wage,ā i > w, higher productivity increases the Þrms' incentive to cluster. However, the opposite holds for Þrms with expected productivity below the cluster wage. Taken together, this implies that the incentives to cluster are the lowest for Þrms with expected productivity that equals the wage in the cluster.
22 Formally,
β . An increase in the wage reduces the creation of human capital at t = 1 (Þrst term) and increases the beneÞts of "selling" human capital at t = 2 (second term). Therefore, if a Þrm sells enough human capital (i.e., if w−āi β is large enough), a Þrm can beneÞt from a higher wage.
is the frequency ofā i in the population. We assume that a i is positive and with bounded support, i.e., a i ∈ [a L , a H ]. We consider equilibria characterized by the formation of a unique cluster C which may contain a positive mass of Þrms, with the rest of the Þrms choosing isolated locations. 23 Under these conditions, because shocks are independent across Þrms, the average productivity in the cluster (i.e., the cluster wage) is deterministic and given by w =ā C = R i∈Cā i g(ā i ). The following proposition, which is proved in the appendix, describes the various equilibria that are possible in this setting:
Proposition 3 The following types of equilibria can emerge in the above described setting: (i) an equilibrium where all Þrms are isolated, (ii) an equilibrium where all Þrms locate within a single cluster, and (iii) an equilibrium where Þrms with both the highest and lowest expected productivities join a cluster and where the middle Þrms locate in isolation. The equilibrium that emerges depends on the population of Þrm characteristics, however, for certain Þrm characteristics, multiple equilibria arise.
Proposition 3 states that there may be multiple equilibria where only those Þrms with the largest and the smallest future expected productivities cluster. In the appendix, we provide a simple example in which two alternative clusters of different sizes and wages can emerge in equilibrium. SpeciÞcally, if Þrms expect a low wage at t = 2 in the cluster, most Þrms join the cluster and the cluster wage is indeed low.
Alternatively, if Þrms expect a high t = 2 cluster wage, fewer Þrms join the cluster, and the cluster wage ends up being high. In the example, the low-wage, larger cluster dominates (in a Pareto sense) the high-wage, smaller cluster, suggesting that policy 23 For simplicity, we do not consider the possibility that more than one cluster can simultaneously arise. This would simply complicate the analysis without providing additional insights. In fact, in the case of multiple coexisting clusters, it is easy to show that all of them would have the same average productivity (i.e., cluster wage) and would exhibit the same properties as the ones described below.
initiatives that promote larger clusters can be welfare-improving.
The possibility of (self-fulÞlling) multiple equilibria suggests a potential role for public intervention.
24 SpeciÞcally, in the example, a contingent policy of wage subsidies (e.g., an offer to subsidize wages in the event that equilibrium wages exceed the level that occurs in the good equilibrium) will attract more of the low expected productivity Þrms to the cluster, which in turn generates lower wages, so that the subsidy will not in fact be required.
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5 Location analysis when workers also invest
Up to now, we have focused on the case where training is not affected by the workers'
effort. This section extends the analysis to consider the location choice when both workers and Þrms can affect the creation of human capital. Formally, we assume that during the initial stage, each worker can exert costly effort l, which enhances the human capital provided by the Þrm. SpeciÞcally, we assume that effort multiplies the worker's acquired human capital by a factor (1 + l) and costs the worker C(l) = k ) and thus exerts effort,
In addition, as in the basic case, we assume that the investment in human capital at t = 1 (by both the Þrm and its workers, i.e., (1 + l)h l 1i ) affects the Þrm's adjustment 24 Public intervention may be required to the extent that the private sector fails to solve the coordination problem. See Rauch (1993) for an analysis of the role of history in the location of industrial clusters and how developers of industrial parks can partly overcome historical inertia.
25 A number of individuals have argued for policy initiatives that promote clustering in knowledge based industries. For example, Lawrence Summers, the president of Harvard University expressed the following opinion on the importance of promoting clustering at the Massachusetts Life Sciences Summit held in Boston on 09/12/2003: "I am convinced that, as strong as (...) the life science cluster is today without combined efforts, it can be far stronger Þve years from now and still stronger a decade from now. And with all of our cooperation, Harvard is certainly prepared to do its part. I believe we can do a great deal for science, for humanity, and for the economy of this area." costs at t = 2. Formally, this implies that Þrm i's production function at t = 2 is
where we have used the super-index l to distinguish this case from the case in which workers' effort cannot affect their human capital.
Homogeneous Þrms
We consider in this sectionthe case where Þrms have identical distributions of their future productivities, i.e., F i (ã i ) = F (ã i ) for all i. Because in isolation Þrm's monopsony power allows them to capture all the beneÞts from the workers' human capital, workers have no incentives to contribute to their training (i.e., l * = 0). Therefore, the value of the isolated Þrm, V I i,l , is still given by V I i from equation (6) i.e., the value in isolation when workers' effort does not affect the creation of human capital:
In clusters, however, since workers capture the beneÞts of the increase in their human capital, they do have an incentive to exert effort. In this case, Þrms solve at t = 2 the following problem:
whose f.o.c. implies that
Because the supply of human capital per Þrm is h
, market clearing yields w =ā. Then, proceeding as in previous sections, we can solve Þrm i's problem at t = 1, (i.e., max h l
) to obtain h 
and subtracting (26) from (29), we obtain the net beneÞt of clustering:
From (30), we can make two observations. First, in addition to the factors previously identiÞed (i.e., σ, β, τ , andā), two other factors affecting Þrm location arise (i.e., α and k). In particular, clustering is more valuable when workers contribute substantially to the creation of human capital (i.e., low k and hence high l * ) and also when Þrms invest heavily in training at t = 1 (i.e., high α and hence high h l * 1i ). This last result holds because of the complementarity between Þrm training and worker effort, i.e., because workers' effort multiplies the human capital provided by Þrms.
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Second, we can identify a sufficient condition for clustering to dominate isolation (i.e., α > k). This condition illustrates an additional rationale for Þrms to cluster even when there is (i) no uncertainty about Þrm productivity (i.e., σ 2 = 0) and (ii) no ex-ante differences in productivity (i.e., F i (ã i ) = F (ã i )). Intuitively, clusters induce workers to contribute to the creation of human capital by mitigating workers' hold-up concerns. This happens because, in contrast to isolation, where Þrms capture the gain associated with the additional human capital created by workers, in clusters workers with more human capital receive higher wages at t = 2.
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26 Notice that workers' effort does not affect the Þrm's investment, i.e., h
τ as given by (15). This is in contrast with the result obtained in the next subsection, when differences in productivity across Þrms are introduced.
27 A recent paper by Rosenthal and Strange (2002) shows that, after controlling for worker speciÞc characteristics, professional workers work longer hours in urban clusters which suggests that, consistent with the analysis here, cities encourage hard work. 28 We are not the Þrst to identify the role of the markets in mitigating hold-up problems. This
Heterogeneous Þrms
This section extends the previous analysis to the case of heterogeneous Þrms (i.e., to a setting like the one in section 4.2). The main purpose is to examine whether the ability of workers to contribute to their human capital can have different effects on the incentives of heterogeneous Þrms to cluster.
In isolation, the analysis remains unchanged because workers do not have incentives to invest in human capital. In clusters, however, the analysis changes. Substituting h l * 2i (given by (28)) into the Þrm's objective function at t = 1 and simplifying the following problem for Þrm i at t = 1:
Notice that now, in contrast to the case with identical Þrms, workers' incentives affects the Þrm's incentive to create human capital at t = 1 (i.e., note the factor (1 + l * )). The reason is that workers' investment in human capital, because of the adjustment costs, increases the Þrm's demand for skilled labor at t = 2.
Solving we
Þnd,
and the Þrm value in the cluster, V C i,l , which can be expressed as:
where h * 1i and V C i are, respectively, the demand for labor and value of the clustered Þrm when workers cannot invest in human capital, i.e., expressions (20) and (21).
role has been recently considered in the Urban Economics literature, i.e., Rotemberg and Saloner (2000) , and Matouschek and Robert-Nicoud (2003) and in the International Trade literature, i.e., McLaren (2000) , and Grossman and Helpman (2002) .
29 Note that the adjustment costs, i.e., −β
depends on workers and Þrm investments in human capital (i.e., l and h From expression (33), we can see the difference in value arising from the workers' investment in human capital. We denote this difference as ∆V
) and refer to it as the "effort-effects." SpeciÞcally, these effects are: (i) a direct effect due to the additional creation of human capital by workers (i.e., the term in the Þrst bracket) 30 and (ii) an indirect effect stemming from the adjustment of the Þrm's demand for labor at t = 1 induced by workers' effort (i.e., term in the second bracket).
31 Expressing the effort-effects as
reveals that ∆V C i,l is positive forā i > w, negative forā i < w 2
, and ambiguous for the remaining range. It can also be easily shown that ∆V C i,l increases with the Þrm's expected productivityā i . Hence, the following proposition can be stated:
Proposition 4 Workers' investment in human capital (i.e., the effort-effects) increase the incentives of high productivity Þrms (ā i > w) to cluster and of low productivity Þrms (ā i < w 2 ) to isolate. Furthermore, the effort-effects increase with a Þrm's productivity (i.e.,
While it is easy to understand why the investment in human capital can promote clustering (in isolation workers do not invest in human capital), it is less straightforward to understand why it can lead Þrms to isolate. The potential incentive to isolate occurs because workers do not in general exert the effort most preferred by Þrms, and in some cases, exert too much effort. To be sure, while workers make their effort 30 This term corresponds to the additional human capital produced by workers, l · h l * 1i , multiplied by the expected proÞts of per unit of human capital, (i.e.,ā i − k l * 2 =ā i − w 2 ). The expected proÞts per unit consist of what the Þrm expects to obtain at t = 2, (i.e.,ā i − w) plus the reduction in its labor costs at t = 1 (i.e., w − k l 2 ). 31 Notice that, due to the effort-effects, both h l * 1i and (due to the adjustment costs) E(h l * 2i ) change by (āi−w)l * τ . These adjustments yield an additional revenue to the Þrm of Q(h
(ā i − w) 2 at t = 1, and of (h
decision at t = 1 based on the wage they expect to receive (i.e., max l (wl − k l 2 2 )), Þrms expect to receive from that effort only the Þrm's expected productivity,ā i (net of the cost of effort) at t = 2 (i.e.,ā i l − k
). 32 SpeciÞcally, ifā i < w (ā i > w) workers' effort is too large (too small) from the point of view of the Þrm. Furthermore, when the Þrm's expected productivity is small enough (i.e.,ā i < w 2 ), workers' effort actually reduces the value of the Þrm (i.e., the Þrm would be better off if workers exert no effort rather than l * ).
The prior discussion focuses on the beneÞts of the effort-effects on clustering. 33 To examine how workers' effort affect the comparative statics on Þrm location discussed in section 4, we need to consider the other factors that inßuence clustering and how they interact with the effort-effects. For brevity, we focus next on the effect of a Þrm's expected productivity on location.
As proposition 4 states, workers' effort induces high productivity Þrms (ā i > w)
to cluster, and low productivity Þrms (ā i < w) to isolate. In contrast, as result (iv) in proposition 2 shows, without workers' effort, the incentive to join the cluster increases for Þrms with extreme (i.e., very high and very low) expected productivity (i.e.,
) so that, clusters exhibit a U-shape. The joint consideration of these two results implies that workers' effort reinforces the tendency of high productivity Þrms (ā i > w) to cluster and weakens the tendency of low productivity Þrms (ā i < w) to do so. 34 In fact, as the following proposition states, under certain conditions, "effort-effects" dominate and reverse the tendency of low productivity Þrms to join the cluster:
32 Notice that, due to the adjustment costs, worker effort increases the Þrm's demand for skilled labor at t = 2, which has an expected productivity ofā i .
33 Effort-effects do not affect isolated Þrms, since
is also a measure of how these effort-effects affect Þrms clustering vis-a-vis isolation, i.e., (
may still be negative.
Proposition 5 For a sufficiently large α, the incentive to cluster increases with the Þrm expected productivity,
The intuition for the proposition is as follows: As discussed above, workers fail to consider the full effects of their effort on Þrm value, so Þrms can even experience a reduction in value due to their workers' effort. This externality is more pronounced when α is larger because, in this case, Þrms choose a higher h l * 1i , and workers choose a higher effort, i.e., l * h l * 1i . The discussion above, although made in the context of a given wage (i.e., partial equilibrium) has implications on the issue of the endogenous formation of clusters.
In contrast to the case without effort-effects, where Þrms with low as well as high productivity have the highest incentives to cluster, effort-effects produce an additional impetus for Þrms with the highest productivity to join the cluster. This suggests that the empirical evidence on the beneÞts of clusters should be cautiously interpreted.
For instance, an alternative interpretation to the Þndings by Henderson (1986) and Ciccone and Hall (1996) , that productivity increases with the density of the economic activity and by Holmes and Stevens (2002) , that plant sizes are higher within industry clusters, is that clusters attract the most efficient Þrms, rather than make existing Þrms more efficient.
We Þnish this section with a brief mention of one important assumption that we maintain throughout the analysis: the fact that we do not allow long-term contracts between workers and Þrms. While realistic legal reasons can justify this assumption, this section provides an additional justiÞcation for the exclusion of long-term contracts. Consistent with Grossman and Hart (1986) , the impossibility to contract in the actual provision of human capital (both by Þrms and by workers) can severely reduce the ability of long-term contracts (e.g., a guaranteed wage set at t = 1 in exchange for the worker's labor services at t = 2) to induce the efficient human capital investment. In this setting, unless workers receive some beneÞts at the margin from their investments in human capital, they fail to provide effort and, hence, a suboptimal creation of human capital would prevail.
35
6 Aggregate uncertainty, Þrm-speciÞc risk and technology standards
So far, we have considered Þrm speciÞc shocks and hence, our economy has been characterized by no aggregate uncertainty. In this section, we Þrst introduce uncertainty about aggregate productivity (i.e., systematic shocks), and then we allow Þrms to design their production processes in ways that make them more or less sensitive to these systematic shocks. To simplify the exposition, we perform the analysis in the basic setting of sections 3 and 4 which abstracts from workers' effort in the creation of human capital.
Location and aggregate uncertainty
We introduce aggregate uncertainty (i.e., correlated productivity shocks) by modeling a Þrm's random productivity at t = 2 as:
whereā > 0 is deterministic andṽ, a systematic shock, andb i , a Þrm-idiosyncratic shock, are two independent random variables. 36 We assume that 0
The analysis also suggests that there may be differences in how workers are compensated in clusters vis-a-vis isolated Þrms. In isolation, inducing worker effort is the more important incentive problem, suggesting that it may be optimal to consider incentive compensation contracts. In clusters, worker retention is the more important concern for Þrms, so we may expect to see longer-term compensation contracts to address this issue. Although we have abstracted from these issues in our model, these compensation issues would be interesting to explore in future work.
36 Our previous analysis can be seen as a particular case of this model in which γ = 0.
). In addition, we further decompose the systematic shockṽ intõ
where 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, E(ṽ 1 ) = E(ṽ 2 ) = 0 and V ar(ṽ 1 ) ≡ σ 2 v1 and V ar(ṽ 2 ) ≡ σ 2 v2 . We assume that the realization ofṽ 1 (i.e., v 1 ) is known to Þrms after they locate at t = 0 but before they make their training decisions at t = 1 (i.e., h 1i ). However, v 2 , the realization ofṽ 2 , is known by Þrms only after they have chosen h 1i . The parameter θ measures how much of the aggregate shock is known by Þrms before they make their training choices.
As before, a Þrm's location choice boils down to a comparison of its value in isolation and in the cluster. In isolation, the human capital created at t = 1, h 1i , depends on the Þrm's expected productivity at t = 2, which, for a given realization ofṽ 1 is: E(ã i |v 1 ) =ā + θγv 1 . Hence, Þrm value conditional on v 1 (i.e., V I i |v 1 ) can be obtained after substituting E(ã i |v 1 ) forā in (6)
The (unconditional) Þrm value can then be determined by integrating over all possible values of v 1 :
Equation (38) shows that although, an isolated Þrm Þnds the distinction between aggregate and Þrm-speciÞc uncertainty irrelevant, the Þrm achieves a higher value (i.e., the term
in (38)) when it can incorporate more information (i.e., the shock v 1 ) into their investment decision, h 1i .
In clusters, however, the distinction between aggregate and Þrm-speciÞc risk is relevant because aggregate shocks, since they affect all Þrms, inßuence the wage at t = 2. To Þnd the value of a clustered Þrm, we Þrst obtain Þrm and wage values conditional on given realizations of v 1 and v 2 , and then, we successively integrate over v 2 and v 1 to Þnd the ex-ante (unconditional) Þrm and wage values.
For a given v 1 and v 2 , market clearing implies that w|v 1 , v 2 =ā + γ(θ 1/2 v 1 + (1 − θ) 1/2 v 2 ). Furthermore, the value of a Þrm with realized productivity a i (i.e.,
Taking expectations over v 2 and b i , we Þnd that the expected wage is E(w|v 1 ) = a + θ 1/2 v 1 and that the Þrm value conditional on v 1 is:
Finally, by integrating over v 1 we Þnd the ex-ante wage, E(w) =ā, and Þrm value,
Examining (41), note that, in contrast to the case of isolation, Þrms in clusters do not take advantage of the early release of information about the aggregate shock, v 1 , and, as a result, Þrm value is not affected byṽ 1 . Notice that in the cluster, the creation of human capital at t = 1 is independent of the aggregate productivity shock
). While a positive shock in a Þrm's expected productivity increases, all else equal, its creation of human capital, a positive aggregate shock also increases the wage at t = 2 (i.e., w =ā + v 1 ) which reduces the Þrm's incentives to create human capital.
37 In other words, as (20) shows, the creation of human capital by a clustered
The fact that E(ã i |v 1 ) = E(w|v 1 ) is an artifact of the production function that we consider. However, the presence of two offsetting effects is quite general: an increase in expected productivity tends to increase wages and, hence, to discourage Þrms' creation of human capital.
Þrm is not determined by its expected productivity, but by the difference between expected productivity and the cluster wage, (i.e., h * 1i = α+(ā i −w) τ ).
Also, from (41), notice that the value of clustered Þrms depends on the Þrm-speciÞc variance, σ 2 b , but not the variance of the systematic shock, σ 2 v . This is because clusters enhance Þrm value by reallocating human capital from Þrms with low productivity shocks to Þrms with high productivity shocks. In the limiting case where the shocks are perfectly correlated, i.e., γ = 1, there would be no reallocation of human capital in the cluster and, hence, no beneÞt to clustering.
To summarize, one can combine (38) with (41) and express the gains to cluster as
which leads us to state the following proposition:
For a given level of total risk, the value of clustering vis-a-vis isolation increases with the relative importance of Þrm-speciÞc risk (low γ) and the level of the aggregate risk that is not anticipated (low θ).
Proposition 6 suggests that, empirically, clusters are more valuable in industries in which Þrms' productivity experience highly idiosyncratic shocks (i.e., high σ 2 b ), and in which aggregate industry productivity is difficult to predict (i.e., low θ).
Firm-speciÞc risk and technological standards
In this section, we endogenize the technology choice and consider choices involving the sensitivities of technologies to Þrm-speciÞc and systematic risks. SpeciÞcally, we assume that Þrms can increase their exposure to Þrm-speciÞc risk (and decrease systematic risk) by selecting a production process that deviates somewhat from what we will refer to as "the standard production process." As we have shown, in clusters, there is a beneÞt associated with increasing Þrm-speciÞc risk that can lead clustered Þrms to deviate from the industry standard. Offsetting this beneÞt is the possibility that the adjustment costs associated with transferring workers from one Þrm to another are higher if a Þrm chooses a less standard production process.
To examine the choice of technological standards, we endogenize the parameter that captures the intensity of the adjustment costs at t = 2 (i.e., β i ). In particular, we assume that a higher β i is associated with a less standard production process and therefore, with an increase in the Þrm's exposure to idiosyncratic risk, i.e., in (35) we set (1 − γ) = g(β i ) where 0 < g(β i ) < 1, g 0 > 0 and g 00 < 0, and hence:
where, as before,ṽ is a systematic shock andb i is a Þrm speciÞc shock. Shocksṽ andb i are independent, with zero mean, and variances σ 2 v and σ 2 b respectively, and therefore,
Firms choose their technology (i.e., β i ) after locating, but before starting the initial stage of production. For simplicity, we assume that both the industry and the Þrm-speciÞc shocks are unanticipated, i.e., θ = 0.
Consistent with our analysis in section 6.1, in isolation, Þrm value is
, which is not affected by adjustment costs and the choice of risk. 38 However, in clusters, these choices do affect Þrm value:
38 This is because (i) in isolation, Þrms do not adjust their scale at t = 2 and (ii) the shocks (Þrm-speciÞc and aggregate) are unanticipated.
39 It is easy to check that, in this case, w =ā, h * 1i = α τ , and h *
Therefore, comparing Þrm values in clusters vis-à-vis in isolation, we get:
As (46) shows, a more idiosyncratic technology, (i.e., a higher β i ) produces two opposing effects: (i) it makes the redeployability of human capital costlier and hence, reduces the value of locating in the cluster and (ii) it makes the possibility of redeploying human capital more valuable (i.e., higher idiosyncratic variance g(β i )σ 2 b ) and hence, increases the value of clustering. From the f.o.c. in (45) (i.e., max β i V C i ), we obtain:
As a Þnal observation notice that previous results suggest that, empirically, the choice of technology by a Þrm is correlated with its location. This is because while idiosyncratic risk and low adjustment costs increase the real option value of being in the cluster, they do not have any impact on isolated Þrms. Therefore, if there is, say, a trade-off between the mean and variance of different technologies, an isolated Þrm will choose the technology that maximizes expected productivity, while clustered Þrms will face a trade-off between expected productivity and speciÞcity (i.e., idiosyncratic risk and adjustment costs). 40 SpeciÞcally, Þrms within a cluster are willing to take on more risk, subject to being not too incompatible with their competitors.
OverconÞdence and the location choice
Up to this point we have assumed that entrepreneurs make rational location choices.
However, there is substantial evidence in the psychology literature that suggests that individuals are overconÞdent about their abilities (e.g., Einhorn 1980) , and there is an extensive literature that explores the implications of overconÞdence on economic behavior.
To explore the effect of overconÞdence on the location choice, we extend the basic model from sections 2 and 3 to allow for the possibility that entrepreneurs have biased perceptions of their Þrms' expected productivity. SpeciÞcally, at t = 0, entrepreneur i wrongly believes that Þrm i's expected productivity is above the average productivity of the economy,ā o i =ā + ∆ with ∆ > 0, but correctly believes that the rest of the Þrms have the same expected productivityā. Workers understand that entrepreneurs are overconÞdent and act accordingly.
41
In isolation, the analysis with overconÞdence corresponds to the analysis in the basic model with productivityā 
where
. We can also compute the Þrm value under the "true" distribution of Þrm productivity, V I i,T :
Notice that while overconÞdence increases the perceived value (which is the value on which the Þrm bases its location decision) V and the demand for skilled workers at t = 2, i.e., h *
Notice that, at t = 2, overconÞdence increases the aggregate supply and demand of skilled labor at t = 2 by the same amount and, hence, leaves unaffected the cluster wage, w =ā. 43 Therefore, substituting previous expressions in (16), we obtain
, and computing the expectation of Þrm value under the true distribution of Þrm productivity, we get
Expression (50) shows that, as in isolation, overconÞdence increases perceived value,
for moderate overconÞdence, i.e., ∆ < 2ā, and V Given the above analysis, it is straightforward to show that overconÞdence increases the tendency of Þrms to cluster. SpeciÞcally,
This is consistent with results from previous sections which indicate that Þrms with (expected) productivity above the cluster average have an incentive to join the cluster.
In addition, overconÞdence has welfare effects. We summarize all these results in the following proposition:
follows immediately from (8) (ii) leads Þrms to cluster if ∆ 0 < ∆, and increases welfare if and only if ∆ 0 < ∆ < ∆ 1 .
We Þnish this section discussing the robustness of its main result, namely, the fact that overconÞdence leads to more clustering. 44 While a comprehensive analysis of the effects of overconÞdence on Þrm location is beyond the scope of this paper, we can examine some of the effects previously discussed. For instance, when one considers worker effort, overconÞdence will enter the location choice through an additional channel. In particular, as we showed in section 5, when workers contribute to the creation of their human capital, Þrms with relatively high productivity beneÞt from being in a cluster, while Þrms with relatively low productivity beneÞt from being in isolation. In the terminology of section 5, effort-effects are positive for Þrms which have or believe they have future productivity that is above the average. This reinforces the conclusion that clusters are more likely to emerge when Þrms are overconÞdent about their future productivities.
We also could have considered an analysis in which workers, as well as entrepreneurs are subject to overconÞdence. In this case, a relatively straightforward extension of our model would suggest an additional force that encourages clustering.
SpeciÞcally, since high ability workers capture the gains associated with their superior human capital within a cluster, but not when they are isolated, workers who believe 44 A parallel analysis with "underconÞdence" (i.e., ∆ < 0) may have some similar effects on location but will not lead to value creation in clusters. The reason is that while overconÞdence serves as a commitment to train workers, alleviating the time inconsistency problem, underconÞdence will have the opposite effect.
that they have superior ability will prefer locating within the cluster, leading to lower expected wages that attract Þrms.
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Concluding remarks
In the early literature on location choice, transportation costs play a key role. Cities arise because of proximity to transportation hubs (e.g., ports) as well as to relatively immobile factors of production. While these theories are still quite important, they do not really apply to what we refer to as knowledge-based Þrms, which require skilled labor, very little transportation costs, and have no exogenous natural locations. There is substantial evidence that the share of aggregate output coming from knowledgebased Þrms continues to increase, so it is natural to ask whether this trend will have an inßuence on the development of our urban areas.
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In contrast to most of the discussion in the literature, the model developed in this paper suggests that Þrms in knowledge-based industries will not necessarily choose to cluster. SpeciÞcally, we show that the incentive for Þrms to locate in industry clusters is determined by how skills are developed, the nature of uncertainty, the expected growth rate of the industry and the ability of Þrms to expand and contract. When workers contribute to their own training, and when there is a substantial amount of Þrm speciÞc uncertainty, there are likely to be substantial gains to clustering.
45 However, not every conceivable extension of the model would lead toward a clustering effect of overconÞdence. For instance, if a Þrm is overconÞdent about its ability to train workers (i.e., low τ o ) or about the industry prospects (i.e., highā), then overconÞdence exacerbates the perceived underinvestment problem in clusters (i.e., h
, and may foster isolation. We thank Ed Glaeser for suggesting these qualiÞcations to our conclusions.
46 Consistent with the increased importance of what we have characterized as knowledge-based Þrms, a recent paper by Glaeser and Kohlhase (2003) provide evidence that indicates that transportation costs for goods declined considerably in the 20th century, while transportation costs for people increased. They Þnd that the U.S. population has moved away from transportation hubs to regions with better consumption opportunities (e.g., better weather). However, they do not examine whether cities have become more economically focused, which one would expect if knowledge-based Þrms tend to cluster to take advantage of knowledge spillovers.
However, in growing industries, in which Þrms invest substantial amounts in their workers' human capital, Þrms may be better off locating apart.
A number of policy issues are raised by the analysis. First, when there are economic advantages associated with clustering, there can be coordination issues that policymakers need to address. For example, our model suggests that there can be inefficient equilibria where too few Þrms cluster, which in turn, suggests that there may be potential gains from policies that indirectly promote clusters, perhaps by offering training subsidies. On the other hand, if entrepreneurs are overconÞdent there can be too much clustering, which suggests that policies that promote clustering can potentially be misguided.
Policymakers also like to think about issues relating to competing clusters. Indeed, representatives of the high tech community in Austin, Texas think about competing with the Silicon Valley cluster and the Hong Kong Þnancial community often express concerns about their competitive advantage relative to Singapore. Since our model is restricted to equilibria with single clusters, we do not address this issue directly, however, the analysis has implications that can be extended to evaluate the competitive advantage of different clusters.
47 SpeciÞcally, the more successful clusters are likely to be those that attract Þrms that are different in dimensions that make them sensitive to different economic shocks, yet similar enough to share resources. In addition, clusters will be more successful in regions where workers have the ability to acquire human capital without a substantial investment by Þrms. Indeed, Saxenian (1994) , in a study of the computer industries in Silicon Valley and Route 128, concluded that Silicon Valley was much more successful that Boston in the 1980s because cross-Þrm networking opportunities in Silicon Valley facilitated the reallocation of workers be-47 See Porter (1990) for an extensive discussion on this topic which includes both the implications on productive decisions by Þrms as well as on public policy.
tween Þrms (i.e., reduced adjustment costs) and helped the more industrious workers develop their human capital.
Finally, it should be noted that factors that determine the extent to which Þrms isolate and cluster in physical space can also be applied to the extent to which Þrms locate in other dimensions as well. For example, competitors may be better able to pool labor and other inputs if the Þrms have similar products, similar production processes, and similar organizational structures. We believe that the analysis in this paper can be applied to address issues relating to industrial clustering on these dimensions, as well as to a theory of corporate inertia, that would arise if corporations are reluctant to adopt innovations because of costs associated with deviating from the cluster.
9 Technical Appendix 9.1 Proofs
Proposition 1
It follows immediately from the text.
Proposition 2
Taking derivatives in (23): 
(ii) If all Þrms cluster, then w =ā. Substituting w forā in (23) yields
Hence, a sufficient condition for the cluster to exist is
, it follows that if Þrm k (Þrm j) with expected productivitȳ a k < w (ā j > w) belongs to the cluster, then Þrm k 0 (Þrm j 0 ) withā k 0 <ā k (ā j 0 >ā j ) will also belong to the cluster. Therefore, a partial cluster will be composed of all the Þrms whose expected productivities belong to the set [a L , a 
Proposition 6
Proposition 7
Because overconÞdence induces clustering, Þrms that would cluster in the absence of overconÞdence will also cluster in the presence of overconÞdence. Therefore, overconÞdence changes true Þrm value according to (51), which is positive if and only ifā > 
Other technical derivations
Equation ( (1 +ā k ) +
) which simpliÞed yields (29).
Equation (33)
Starting as in the derivation of (29) , and simplifying we get (34).
Equation (39)
From ( 
Equation (49)
Plug h * 2i = h * 1i = α+ā+∆ τ in (4) and simplify to get (49).
Equation (50)
Start from V Under these conditions, and using the expressions derived in the proof of proposition 3 above, the following clusters can emerge:
(1) A "high-wage" cluster with w = 6 and limits {a 
